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I n an already classic study of the iPod, Dedrick, Kramer, and Linden (2010) discuss how the iPod is assembled in China from several hundred components and parts that are sourced from around the world. This production network is 
led by Apple, a US-based company, which is estimated to capture between one-third 
and one-half of an iPod’s retail price. Asian fi rms like Toshiba from Japan and 
Samsung from South Korea capture another major part as profi ts from manufac-
turing high-value components, such as the hard-disk drive, display, and memory. In 
contrast, assembling and testing activities by Chinese workers is estimated to capture 
no more than 2 percent. Other studies of tablets, mobile telephones, and laptops 
suggest a similar pattern of specialization; advanced nations deliver capital and 
high-skilled labor, capturing most of the value, while emerging countries contribute 
low-skilled activities that add little value: in another vivid example, Ali-Yrkkö, 
Rouvinen, Seppälä, and Ylä-Anttila (2011) discuss the Nokia N95 smartphone.
Such case studies are mainly conducted for high-end electronics and for one point 
in time, which raises obvious questions about the extent to which they represent broader 
patterns. How pervasive is the process of international production fragmentation for a 
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wider set of products? How does the factor content of these production chains change 
over time when fragmentation deepens? And how do specialization patterns differ 
between high-income and emerging economies that participate in these chains? In 
this paper, we provide a macroeconomic and longitudinal analogy of the iPod exercise, 
using many countries and many manufacturing products. We “slice up the global value 
chain” (to borrow the term from Krugman 1995) using a decomposition technique 
that has recently become feasible due to the development of the World Input- Output 
Database (Timmer et al. 2014). We trace the value added by all labor and capital that 
is directly and indirectly needed for the production of fi nal manufacturing goods. The 
production systems of these goods are highly prone to international fragmentation as 
many stages can be undertaken in any country with little variation in quality.
We seek to establish a series of facts concerning the global fragmentation of 
production that can serve as a starting point for future analysis. After a short over-
view of our data and methods, we discuss four major trends. First, international 
fragmentation, as measured by the foreign value-added content of production, has 
rapidly increased since the early 1990s when it made its appearance on a global scale 
(Feenstra 1998). Second, in most global value chains there is a strong shift towards 
value being added by capital and high-skilled labor, and away from less-skilled labor. 
This suggests a pervasive process of technological change that is biased towards the 
use of skilled labor and capital. Third, within global value chains, advanced nations 
increasingly specialize in activities carried out by high-skilled workers. The direc-
tion of this change follows the intuitive notion of comparative advantage driven 
by relative factor endowments across countries, but the pace at which it occurs has 
not been established before. Fourth, emerging economies surprisingly specialize in 
capital-intensive activities; the capital share in their value added is rising, while the 
share of low-skilled labor in their value added is declining.
International Fragmentation and Factors of Production: Method and 
Data
Before laying out some patterns as to how the international fragmentation 
of production is occurring, it is useful to offer some background on terminology, 
methods, and data.
Concepts and Defi nitions
We wish to study the production fragmentation of fi nal products. A fi nal 
product is consumed, in contrast to intermediate products that continue on in the 
production process. Consumption is broadly defi ned to include private and public 
consumption, as well as investment. A global value chain of a fi nal product is defi ned 
as the value added of all activities that are directly and indirectly needed to produce 
it. This global value chain is identifi ed by the country-industry where the last stage 
of production takes place before delivery to the fi nal user: for example, the global 
value chain of electronics from Chinese electrical equipment manufacturing, or of 
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cars from German transport equipment manufacturing. However, it is important 
to note that the fact that a product is “completed” in a particular country does not 
necessarily mean that domestic fi rms are governing the value chain: for example, 
Apple governs the production network of iPods, although they are completed in 
China. For more on governance in global value chain production, a useful starting 
point is Gereffi  (1999).
The fragmentation of production processes can take many forms, sometimes 
characterized as “snakes” and “spiders” (Baldwin and Venables 2013). Snakes 
involve a sequence in which intermediate goods are sent from country A to B, and 
incorporated into intermediate goods sent from B to C, and so on until they reach 
the fi nal stage of production. Spiders involve multiple parts coming together from 
a number of destinations to a single location for assembly of a new component 
or fi nal product. Most production processes are complex mixtures of the two. To 
stick with commonly used terms, we refer to all fragmented production processes as 
“chains,” despite the snake-like connotation of this term.
In this paper we will focus on the global value chains of fi nal manufacturing 
products, which we refer to as “manufactures.” Of course, these do not only contain 
activities in the manufacturing sector, but also in other sectors such as agriculture, 
utilities, and business services that provide inputs at any stage of the production 
process of manufactures. These indirect contributions are sizeable and will be explic-
itly accounted for through the modeling of input-output linkages across industries. 
The value added in manufactures chains accounts for about 23 percent of global 
GDP in 1995. Similar analysis of global production of fi nal services is possible in 
principle, but the current data is not detailed enough to do so.
The World Input-Output Database
To measure value added in global value chains, we need to track the fl ow of 
products across industries and countries. The World Input-Output Database, which 
is freely available at http://www.wiod.org, has been specifi cally constructed for this 
type of analyses (Timmer et al. 2014; Dietzenbacher et al. 2013). It provides world 
input-output tables for each year since 1995 covering 40  countries, including all 
27 countries of the European Union (as of January 1, 2007) and 13 other major 
economies: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, 
Russia, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, and the United States. These 40  countries 
represent more than 85 percent of world GDP. In addition, a model for the remaining 
noncovered part of the world economy is provided such that the value-added 
 decomposition of fi nal output is complete. It contains data for 35  industries 
covering the overall economy, including agriculture, mining, construction, utili-
ties, 14 manufacturing industries, and 17 services industries. The tables have been 
constructed by combining national input-output tables with bilateral international 
trade data, following the conventions of the System of National Accounts.1
1 An online appendix available with this paper at http://e-jep.org offers more detail on the construction 
of this data.
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One also needs detailed value-added accounts that provide information on 
labor and capital used in production. Three types of workers are identifi ed on the 
basis of educational attainment levels as defi ned in the International Standard 
Classifi cation of Education (ISCED). “Low skilled” (ISCED categories 0, 1, and 2) 
roughly corresponds to less than secondary schooling. “Medium skilled” (3 and 4) 
means secondary schooling and above, including certain professional qualifi ca-
tions, but below college degree. “High skilled” (5 and 6) includes those with a 
college degree and above. For most advanced countries, this data is constructed 
by extending the EU KLEMS database (O’Mahony and Timmer 2009). For other 
countries, additional data has been collected according to the same principles. 
Workers include the self-employed and family workers, and an imputation for 
their income is made. Capital income is derived as a residual and defi ned as gross 
value added minus labor income. It represents remuneration for capital in the 
broadest sense, including physical capital (such as machinery and buildings), land 
(including mineral resources), intangible capital (such as patents and trademarks), 
and fi nancial capital.
Decomposing Global Value Chains
Our aim is to decompose the value of a fi nal product into the value added by all 
labor and capital employed in its global value chain. We begin by modeling the world 
economy as an input-output model in the tradition of Leontief (1936) and trace the 
amount of factor inputs needed to produce a certain amount of fi nal output. Leontief’s 
seminal insight is rather straightforward and intuitive: to produce output one needs 
labor, capital, and intermediate inputs. These intermediates need to be produced 
themselves, involving again production factors and intermediates, and so on until 
all intermediates are accounted for. He provided a mathematical model that allows 
one to trace the inputs needed in all the stages of production. For an introduction 
to input-output analysis, Miller and Blair (2009) provide a useful starting point.2 As 
an end result, the value of any particular fi nal product is decomposed into the value 
added by all labor and capital that was needed in any stage of production. In this way, 
one can provide a consistent accounting system of all value added and all global value 
chains in the world, as illustrated by Figure 1.
The fi nal column in Figure 1 provides the value added by workers and capital 
employed in a particular industry and country. A row shows the distribution of 
this value added across all global value chains in which the industry participates. 
The global value chains are represented by the columns. There is one column for 
each fi nal good or service produced in each country. The cells in the column show 
the origin of all value added needed for the production of the fi nal good. The 
2 A formal description of the method can be found in the appendix with the papers at the JEP website: 
http://e-jep.org. Our approach is related to Johnson and Noguera (2012a) and Koopman, Wang, and 
Wei (2014). Rather than using Leontief’s insight to analyze the value-added content of trade fl ows, we 
focus on the value-added content of fi nal demand. This is more in the spirit of work by Dietzenbacher 
and Romero (2007) and Antràs, Chor, Fally, and Hillberry (2012), who compute the average number of 
“transactions” a dollar of a given product will go through before being sold for fi nal use.
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sum across all participating industries makes up the gross output value of the fi nal 
product, given in the bottom row. Note that these industries are domestic as well as 
foreign. As all fi nal products are being consumed somewhere in the world, output 
values will equal expenditure. Thus both the columns and the rows add up to world 
GDP as global fi nal expenditure must be equal to global value added by national 
accounting convention.
In Table 1, we provide a real world example of the results of such decom-
position for the fi nal output of the transport equipment manufacturing industry 
in Germany—in short, German cars.3 By summing over all value that is added 
by labor and capital employed in German industries, the domestic value-
added content of the product can be calculated. This includes value added 
in the car industry itself, but also in other German industries that deliver along 
the production chain, including services industries. Between 1995 and 2008, the 
domestic value-added content dropped from 79 to 66 percent. On the fl ip side, 
the foreign value-added share increased as intermediates were increasingly 
imported, generating income for labor and capital employed outside Germany. 
The foreign value-added share is an indicator of the international fragmentation 
of production and will be used later on.
3 In this example, as well as in the remainder of the paper, we will analyze the value of fi nal products 
at basic prices, which is the ex-factory gate price before delivery to the fi nal consumer. This means 
that retail trade margins and net taxes are not included. Retail margins can be sizable, and the World 
Input-Output Database provides data to analyze these margins as well, but this is outside the scope of the 
present paper as retailing is an activity that is still mainly domestic by nature.
Figure 1 
An Accounting Framework for Global Value Chains
Note: Cell values represent the value added generated in the country-industry given in the row, within the 
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The factor content of the global value chain of German cars changed as well. 
To see this, one can sum over value added by all labor, irrespective of its location, 
and similarly for capital. We fi nd that the value added by capital increased from 29 
to 35 percent, while the share of labor dropped from 71 to 65 percent. The drop 
in labor was almost exclusively for less-skilled workers in Germany. The share for 
high-skilled workers both within and outside Germany increased.
The patterns of shifting location and factor content of activities in the global 
value chain of German cars are representative for many other chains of manufac-
tures, as we will see in the remainder of this paper. Throughout we will focus on the 
period from 1995 to 2008 because our data starts in 1995, and 2008 marks the end 
of a period as the global fi nancial crisis struck. The fi ndings do not depend on the 
particular choice of beginning or ending year as all of the trends we discuss in this 
paper are gradual and monotonic, unless noted otherwise.
Trend 1: International Fragmentation of Production is Expanding
With plummeting costs of communication and coordination, it has become 
increasingly profi table to split the production process, with each stage at its 
lowest-cost location. Knowledge about the extent and development of international 
production fragmentation remains sketchy however. Some empirical papers have 
studied cross-border fragmentation based on foreign investment fl ow data of fi rms 
Table 1 
Slicing Up the Global Value Chain of German Cars 
(  percent of fi nal output value)
1995 2008
German value added 79% 66%
 High-skilled labor 16% 17%
 Medium-skilled labor 34% 25%
 Low-skilled labor 7% 4%
 Capital 21% 20%
Foreign value added 21% 34%
 High-skilled labor 3% 6%
 Medium-skilled labor 6% 9%
 Low-skilled labor 4% 4%
 Capital 8% 15%
Total fi nal output 100% 100%
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output 
Database, November 2013 Release.
Note: The table gives a breakdown of the value added to fi nal 
output from German transport equipment manufacturing 
(ISIC rev. 3 industries 34 and 35).
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and their affi liates: for example, see Fukao, Ishido, and Ito (2003) and Ando and 
Kimura (2005) for Japanese fi rms; Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2005) for 
US fi rms; and Marin (2011) for German and Austrian multinationals. Macroeco-
nomic evidence has been presented by Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) and Johnson 
and Noguera (2012a, b), who found increasing vertical specialization in trade for 
most countries (see the contribution of Johnson in this symposium for an over-
view). Here we provide complementary analysis that provides direct evidence of 
fragmentation focusing on the value chains of fi nal products.
In Figure 2, we plot foreign value-added shares in 1995 on the horizontal axis 
and 2008 on the vertical axis, together with a 45-degree line. Products are identifi ed 
by the country and industry of completion, so we have data for 560 fi nal products 
from 14 manufacturing industries in 40 countries for each year. For 85 percent of 
the product chains, the foreign value-added share has increased, indicating the 
pervasiveness of international fragmentation. The (unweighted) average foreign 
share rose from 28 to 34 percent.
Figure 2 
Foreign Value-Added Shares in 560 Global Value Chains, 1995 and 2008
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, November 2013 Release.
Notes: Each dot represents the share of foreign value added in output of a manufactures global value 
chain in 1995 and 2008. Shares are plotted for 560 global value chains, identifi ed by 14 manufacturing 
industries of completion in 40 countries. Squares indicate global value chains of electrical equipment 
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The extent of fragmentation varies greatly across products. Petroleum products 
are represented by diamonds in the fi gure. They have very high foreign value-added 
shares because most countries do not have access to domestic oil feedstock, refl ected 
in a cluster of diamond-shaped points in the upper part of Figure 2. Value chains for 
electrical equipment, typically regarded as the paragon of international production 
fragmentation, are shown by square points. For these products, foreign value-added 
shares are indeed above average and increased from 33 to 40 percent. In contrast, 
manufactured foodstuffs have relatively low shares, as most of the intermediates are 
sourced from local agriculture. But even for these products, foreign shares have 
increased over time.
The global fi nancial crisis created a dip in fragmentation in 2008 and 2009, 
but Los, Timmer, and de Vries (forthcoming) show that the trend picked up again 
in 2010. Contrary to the anecdotes of multinationals re-shoring production, they 
found no serious signs of a major reversal yet. However, they do fi nd a major 
change in the geographical nature of fragmentation. In the 1990s, fragmentation 
mainly took place within regional blocks: North America (NAFTA), the European 
Union, and Asia. But in the 2000s, global value chains have started to become truly 
global with the advance of emerging economies as major suppliers of intermedi-
ates. Whether this trend towards global fragmentation of value chains will continue 
in the future will depend on a host of determinants, including developments in 
wages and productivity, costs of transportation and trading, coordination costs, risk 
considerations, and the strength of linkages between various activities. For example, 
Baldwin and Venables (2013) argue that certain high-value-added tasks may well 
remain clustered in space because of strong localized complementarities, leading to 
possibly large discontinuities in the fragmentation process. Furthermore, offshored 
activities that are currently low-skilled-labor intensive might be re-shored if tech-
nological progress makes mechanized production in capital-abundant countries 
cheaper. It remains to be seen how the different forces will play out in the future.
Trend 2: More Value Added from High-Skilled Labor and Capital
The opening up of China, India, and other emerging economies provided an 
enduring increase in the global supply of low-skilled labor. How has this affected 
the factor income distribution in global value chains? This is driven by the relative 
prices of various types of labor and capital, as well as possibilities for factor substitu-
tion, both within and across countries. We fi rst provide evidence on factor content 
changes at the global level, followed by specialization trends in high-income and 
emerging economies separately. After that we offer some discussion of a framework 
that might be suitable when thinking about these trends.
Changes in factor income shares in global value chains have been plotted in 
Figure 3. The value of fi nal manufacturing goods is decomposed into value added 
by four factors: capital and low-, medium-, and high-skilled labor. (In our approach, 
value added and income of factors are equivalent, so these terms will be used 
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interchangeably.) For each factor we show on the horizontal axis the income share 
in 1995 and on the vertical axis the share in 2008. Points above the 45-degree line 
indicate global value chains in which the factor has increased its share. As before, 
we have in total 560 value chains: 14 manufacturing product groups with 40 possible 
countries of completion. In 64 percent of the chains, the share of value added by 
capital has increased. The average increase was about 1 percentage point, with a large 
variance: in some chains the capital share increased by more than 20 percentage 
points. It was particularly strong in those production chains where the fi nal output 
was high, such as transport equipment and machinery with China, Germany, and 
the United States as countries of completion, in which capital shares increased by 
8 percentage points or more. The increase in income shares for high-skilled workers 
was particularly pervasive and positive, happening in 92 percent of the chains. The 
Figure 3 
Factor Shares in Value Added of 560 Global Value Chains of Manufactures, 
1995 and 2008
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, November 2013 Release.
Notes: Factor shares in value added of 560  global value chains, identifi ed by 14  manufacturing 
industries of completion in 40 countries, in 1995 (x-axis) and in 2008 (y-axis).  The dashed line is the 
45-degree line.
A: Capital share    B: High-skilled labor share  
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unweighted average was about 4  percentage points, with a much lower variance 
than for capital. A notable outlier is the US electrical equipment industry where 
the share increased by 12 percentage points. On the fl ip side, the income shares for 
medium- and low-skilled labor dropped in many value chains. The medium-skilled 
share declined in 56 percent of the cases, with an average of 1 percentage point. 
The decline has been particularly severe in major chains, like those of machinery 
and of transport equipment with Germany and the United States as countries of 
completion (6 to 8  percentage points decline). The clearest trend is found for 
low-skilled shares, which declined in 91 percent of the cases. The average decline 
was 5 percentage points with occasional declines of more than 10 percentage points, 
in particular in European food chains—for example, with France, Italy, and Spain 
as countries of completion. As we will see later, declines in low-skilled shares are not 
only found in chains ending in high-income countries, but also in many chains that 
have a low-income economy as country-of-completion.
What are the macroeconomic effects? In the analysis above, each product chain 
was considered irrespective of its size. But bigger chains play a larger role in the 
global economy than smaller ones. Chains of products like food, transport equip-
ment, and machinery typically have larger fi nal output, as well as chains ending 
in bigger economies. To account for this, we take fi nal output of all manufactures 
together (by summing over 560 manufactures chains) and provide a similar decom-
position of value added. In effect, the factor shares are now weighted by the fi nal 
output of their chain. The results are given in Table 2. Global expenditure on manu-
factures increased by almost one-third, from $6,586 billion in 1995 to $8,684 billion 
in 2008 (in constant 1995 prices). We fi nd that the shares of value added by capital 
and high-skilled workers increased at this aggregate level. This confi rms that the 
patterns found above are not driven by developments in small chains only, but are 
Table 2 
Factor Shares in Global Value Chains of All Manufactures




 capital (%) 40.9% 47.4% 6.5%
 high-skilled labor (%) 13.8% 15.4% 1.5%
 medium-skilled labor (%) 28.7% 24.4% − 4.2%
 low-skilled labor (%) 16.6% 12.8% − 3.8%
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, November 2013 Release.
Notes: The table presents shares of production factors in total value added based on all global value 
chains of manufactures. Shares add up to 100 percent. Value added is at basic prices (hence excluding 
net taxes, trade, and transport margins on output). It is converted to US dollars with offi cial exchange 
rates and defl ated to 1995 prices with the US Consumer Price Index. Figures shown may not add due 
to rounding.
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economically signifi cant. The share of value added by capital increased by more than 
6 percentage points as the upward shift was most pronounced in bigger chains. The 
share of high-skilled workers increased as well, but not as fast, with 1.5 percentage 
points. The shares of low- and medium-skilled workers declined both by about 
4 percentage points.
Thus, we fi nd a bifurcation in the factor content of global value chains with 
increasing capital and high-skilled labor income on the one hand, and declining 
shares for medium- and particularly for low-skilled labor on the other. Together 
capital and high-skilled labor captured 55 percent of manufactures value in 1995, 
increasing to 63 percent in 2008. This increase is especially marked at the end 
of the 1990s and again from 2003 to 2006. The latter period coincides with a 
step up in the global presence of China after its accession to the World Trade 
Organization in 2001. This fi nding is consistent with the model of Rodrik (1997). 
He argues that the opening up of international capital markets increased the 
opportunities for quick relocation of capital. In his argument, this led to a decline 
in the bargaining power of labor around the world, limiting the share of labor in 
value added vis-à-vis capital.
Trend 3: Enhanced Specialization in High-Skilled Labor in 
High-Income Countries
What happened to the location of value added in global value chains? And 
did specialization patterns vary between regions? To this end, we group Australia, 
Canada, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the United States, and the 15 pre-2004 
members of the European Union in one group and place all other countries in the 
world in another group. Roughly speaking, this can be viewed as a comparison of 
the high-income countries of the world and other countries that play an active role 
in international trade (Hanson 2012). The share of high-income countries in total 
value added generated in all manufactures chains declined from 74 percent in 1995 
to 56  percent in 2008. The share of high-income East Asia declined from 21 to 
11 percent. Shares in North America and high-income Europe declined by around 
4  percentage points each. In contrast, emerging regions have rapidly increased 
shares by 18 percentage points. China is responsible for half of this increase, from 4 
to 13 percent, accelerating in the period after it joined the World Trade Organiza-
tion in 2001. Shares also rapidly increased in other emerging economies, including 
Brazil, Russia, India, and Mexico.4
4 This is shown in Appendix Table 1, available online with this article at http://e-jep.org. Given sizable 
fl ows of foreign investment, part of the value added in emerging regions will accrue as income to multina-
tional fi rms headquartered in advanced regions. However, analyzing capital income on a national rather 
than a domestic basis is notoriously diffi cult. To establish the full link from production value-added to 
factor incomes and fi nally to personal income distributions, one would additionally need data on the 
actual ownership of fi rms (Lipsey 2010).
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Concomitant with this change in location of production, specialization patterns 
changed as well. In the traditional Heckscher–Ohlin model of trade, countries will 
focus on producing goods intensive in those factors that are relatively abundant. As 
a production chain fragments across countries, one might expect that the standard 
Heckscher–Ohlin predictions will still hold: the rise of China and other emerging 
economies accelerates the erosion of mature economies’ comparative advantage in 
labor-intensive production tasks, while simultaneously offering new opportunities 
for offshoring (Hanson 2012). Thus, advanced countries will focus more on activi-
ties that require high-skilled labor and capital, and other countries will specialize in 
less-skilled activities.
To test these predictions, we provide more information on the factor content 
of global value chain production in the two regions in Table 3. The upper panel 
shows that in the high-income countries the share of capital increased from 36 
to 39 percent, while the share of labor declined correspondingly. But the major 
income shift is observed across labor categories. The value added by high-skilled 
workers increased by 5 percentage points, while the combined share of medium- and 
Table 3 
Factor Shares in Global Value Chains of Manufactures, by Region
Value added in value chains of manufactures 1995 2008 2008 minus 1995




 capital (%) 35.9% 38.7% 2.9%
 high-skilled labor (%) 16.8% 21.8% 5.0%
 medium-skilled labor (%) 33.3% 30.3% − 3.0%





 capital (%) 55.2% 58.4% 3.2%
 high-skilled labor (%) 5.4% 7.1% 1.7%
 medium-skilled labor (%) 15.6% 17.0% 1.4%




Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, November 2013 Release.
Notes: Shares of production factors in total value added in a region, based on all global value chains 
of manufactures. Value added by a region is sum of value added by labor and capital on the domestic 
territory. High-income countries include Australia, Canada, and the United States; Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan; and all 15  countries that joined the European Union before 2004. Value added and 
expenditure is at basic prices (hence excluding net taxes, trade, and transport margins on output). It is 
converted to US dollars with offi cial exchange rates and defl ated to 1995 prices with the US Consumer 
Price Index. Figures may not add due to rounding.
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low-skilled workers declined by 8 percentage points. The direction of this change 
is in line with the Heckscher–Ohlin intuition, but the magnitude of the changes 
differs across countries. In Table  4, we provide similar decompositions for indi-
vidual countries. Looking fi rst at the high-income group of countries, capital 
income shares increased in most countries, except in the United Kingdom and Italy, 
with the largest increases found in Germany and South Korea (7 and 9 percentage 
points). The value-added share by high-skilled workers increased in all countries 
in this group, ranging from around 3  percentage points in Australia, Germany, 
and Japan and 4 in the United States to more than 8 in France, the Netherlands, 
South Korea, and the United Kingdom. Income shares of other labor declined all 
around in the high-income countries. In Canada, Germany, and the United States, 
medium-skilled labor shares declined faster than low-skilled shares. In other coun-
tries like France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain, as well as in South Korea 
Table 4 










United States 3.9 − 1.9 − 5.9 4.0
Japan 4.5 − 5.4 − 2.1 3.1
Germany 6.8 − 2.8 − 7.4 3.4
France 0.2 − 8.7 0.1 8.4
United Kingdom − 3.4 − 8.0 1.2 10.2
Italy − 1.1 − 14.8 10.4 5.5
Spain 0.1 − 12.9 4.7 8.1
Canada 1.8 − 2.0 − 4.6 4.8
Australia 6.0 − 8.4 − 0.9 3.3
South Korea 9.3 − 11.6 − 5.6 8.0
Netherlands 5.5 − 7.3 − 7.1 8.9
Total all high-income 2.9 − 4.9 − 3.0 5.0
China 9.3 − 9.3 − 2.1 2.0
Russian Federation 1.1 − 1.6 − 2.4 2.8
Brazil − 6.7 − 4.8 7.5 4.0
India 4.5 − 5.9 − 1.7 3.1
Mexico 6.4 − 4.2 − 0.5 − 1.7
Turkey − 12.7 4.5 5.2 3.1
Indonesia 5.3 − 8.1 1.3 1.6
World minus all high-income 3.2 − 6.3 1.4 1.7
World 6.5 − 3.8 − 4.2 1.5
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, November 2013 Release.
Notes: See Table 3. In this table, the percentage point changes in factor shares are given for each country. 
Changes in four factors for each country add up to zero by defi nition, but here they may not due to 
rounding. Countries are ranked by GDP.
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and Australia, low-skilled workers’ income shares suffered most, sometimes by more 
than 10 percentage points.
Declining incomes and jobs for less-skilled workers have stirred major policy 
concerns, mostly framed in terms of “manufacturing decline,” and have prompted 
various initiatives for “re-industrialization” in a number of former industrial strong-
holds. Setting aside the merits of such proposals, it is important to note that with 
fragmented production, sectors like “manufacturing” are becoming the wrong way 
to evaluate economic performance and to frame public policies. Competitiveness 
is no longer solely determined by domestic clusters of manufacturing fi rms but 
relies increasingly also on the successful integration of other tasks in the chain, 
both domestic and foreign ones. To illustrate, the production of fi nal manufactures 
involves not only jobs in the manufacturing sector but also jobs outside manufac-
turing that are indirectly related through the delivery of intermediate goods and 
services. In fact, in 2008 the latter made up almost half of all jobs related to manu-
factures production. Specialization in global value chains might therefore lead to 
declining jobs in traditional manufacturing but might also generate new jobs outside 
manufacturing. Indeed, in almost all high-income countries, the number of services 
jobs related to manufacturing production increased during this period, with the 
notable exceptions of the United Kingdom and the United States. In Germany and 
Italy, this increase was even faster than the decline in manufacturing jobs such that 
the net effect was positive (Timmer, Los, Stehrer, and de Vries 2013). Trade, labor, 
and industrial policies would do well to take into account the increased vertical 
integration of production within and across countries (Baldwin and Evenett 2012). 
Trend 4: Enhanced Specialization in Capital in Emerging Economies 
What happened to specialization patterns in the rest of the world? Based on the 
standard Heckscher–Ohlin predictions, one might expect the value-added share of 
less-skilled workers to increase in this region. This did not happen, as shown in the 
lower part of Table 3. The share of low-skilled workers declined by 6 percentage 
points from 24 percent in 1995 to 18 percent in 2008. The share of medium-skilled 
workers increased, but only by one  percentage point. This is not to say that the 
number of workers employed in global value chains in manufacturing declined. On 
the contrary: 42 million jobs in China were added, 20 million in India, 6 million in 
Brazil, and 2 million in Mexico. (These fi gures are spelled out in Appendix Table 2, 
available online with this article at http://e-jep.org.) But in these countries as a 
whole, wages remained relatively low, and global value chain production mainly 
benefi ted capital. In 1995, the value-added share of capital in emerging economies 
was already high at 55 percent, compared to 36 percent in the high-income region. 
This is perhaps not surprising because these countries are abundant in labor, but it 
actually increased even further by 3 percentage points in the period up to 2008. The 
capital share in China increased by almost 10 percentage points. Capital shares in 
other major emerging economies like India, Indonesia, and Mexico also increased, 
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by around 5 percentage points, as shown in Table 4. These developments fi t a modern 
variant of the classical story of surplus labor by Lewis (1954). With capital being 
globally mobile, it will relocate to locations with high rental-wage ratios. As long as 
there is a reservoir of unskilled labor that can be employed at wages well below their 
marginal productivity, rental-wage ratios will remain high. Thus, the income share 
of capital will increase in early stages of development, rather than decline.
Table 4 also shows that the value-added share of high-skilled workers increased 
in almost all emerging economies. This echoes the changes that took place in 
Mexico when it entered into production chains with the United States in the 1980s 
(Feenstra and Hanson 1996). In their seminal model of offshoring (Feenstra and 
Hanson 1997), they related this to the establishment of so-called “maquiladoras” by 
US fi rms located across the US–Mexican border. Suppose that the good originally 
produced by the United States can be divided into two tasks. One task is relatively 
low-skilled intensive, like assembly of components, and the other task is high-skilled 
intensive, like producing high-tech components. As the relatively low-skilled task is 
offshored to Mexico, production in the United States will become more high skilled, 
further specializing in its abundant factor. Average skill intensity in Mexico increased 
after fragmentation in the 1980s. However, this is only one possible outcome, which 
will depend on the skill intensity of the offshored task compared to the existing skill 
intensity of production in the country (Arndt and Kierzkovski 2001; Feenstra 2010). 
It could also be that the average skill intensity of production would actually decrease 
rather than go up, as illustrated by more recent trends in Mexico; see Table 4. In 
fact, many outcomes are theoretically possible and to fully understand the complex 
patterns at work we need to further refi ne our thinking about the production process. 
In the fi nal section, we sketch the main elements of such a framework.
Tasks, Substitution, Complements, and Technological Change
Production processes in manufacturing have increasingly fragmented across 
national borders, and the change in their factor content was clearly biased towards 
high-skilled labor and capital. This pattern was not only found for activities carried 
out in high-income countries, but also in emerging economies. In particular, the 
widespread increase in the value-added share of high-skilled workers was remark-
able. In Figure 4, we plot for each of the 40 countries in the World Input-Output 
Database the share of value added by high-skilled workers for 1995 on the horizontal 
axis and for 2008 on the vertical axis. All observations, except two (Mexico and 
Estonia), are above the dotted 45-degree line, indicating a global shift towards use of 
relatively more high-skilled workers in global value chains in all of these countries.
What might account for this pattern? In traditional models of production, factor 
shares are determined by the interplay of relative prices of factors, their elasticities 
of substitution, and the nature of technical change. For example, opening up Asian 
economies led to a shock in the global supply of unskilled workers. Whether this 
change will lead to an increase in its factor share will depend on the elasticity of 
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substitution between unskilled workers in Asia and elsewhere, but also on the substitu-
tion possibilities between unskilled and skilled workers, as well as between unskilled 
workers and capital. Another important element is the rapid advance in the infor-
mation and communication technology industry, driving down the relative price of 
information technology capital (  Jorgenson 2001). Again, the effects on the share 
of capital income will crucially depend on the substitution possibilities between infor-
mation technology capital on the one hand, and various types of labor on the other.
Substitution possibilities are hard to model and measure. Archetype models 
of growth and international trade rely on production functions where elasticities 
of substitution are rather restricted.5 In these models, the production process is 
conceived of as a mapping from factor inputs to output, as if taking place in one 
5 The most often-used production functions are the so-called Cobb–Douglas and the constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) functions. In the Cobb–Douglas function, elasticities are always one. Hence factor 
Figure 4 
Shares of High-Skilled Labor in Value Added of All Global Value Chains of 
Manufactures, by Country
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, November 2013 Release.
Notes: Shares of high-skilled workers in a country’s value added, based on all global value chains of 
manufactures, in 1995 (x-axis) and in 2008 (y-axis). The dashed line is the 45-degree  line. Indicated 
are China (CHN), India (IND), Mexico (MEX), Ireland (IRL), Japan (JPN), the Netherlands (NLD), 
Spain (ESP), the United Kingdom (GBR), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), South Korea 

























0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25 .3 .35
1995
Slicing Up Global Value Chains     115
stage. With fragmentation, however, it can be more useful to model the genera-
tion of output as a result of a set of “tasks” which are to be completed by various 
combinations of production factors. So rather than a direct mapping from labor 
and capital inputs to output, factors map into tasks, which subsequently map into 
output. This framework allows for a richer modeling of complementarities and 
substitution possibilities between various factors of production, both domestic 
and foreign.
An example of this is found in recent models of labor demand discussed 
in Acemoglu and Autor (2011). They outline a general framework that revolves 
around differences in comparative advantages of factors in carrying out tasks: 
all workers can carry out all tasks, but some are relatively better at carrying out 
certain tasks (hence are said to have a comparative advantage in this task). Substi-
tution of skills across tasks is possible, such that there is an endogenous mapping 
from workers to tasks depending solely on labor supplies and the comparative 
advantages of the various skill types. The framework also allows for capital as an 
input, by modeling it as another source competing with labor for the supplying 
of certain tasks. For example, new information technology capital might be much 
better in handling routine administrative tasks than skilled white-collar labor. 
According to the “routinization hypothesis” put forward by Autor, Levy, and 
Murnane (2003), information technology capital complements highly educated 
workers engaged in abstract tasks, substitutes for moderately educated workers 
performing routine tasks, and has little effect on less-skilled workers performing 
manual tasks and tasks that require personal interactions, such as in many services. 
The latter tasks are less important in manufacturing global value chains, which 
is consistent with our observation that income shares for both low- and medium-
skilled workers in manufactures are declining (Foster-McGregor, Stehrer, and 
de Vries 2013).
The increasing importance of intangible capital provides another potential 
explanation for the increasing value-added shares of capital and high-skilled 
workers. Recent investment in advanced countries is increasingly directed towards 
intangibles such as intellectual capital (including software and databases, research 
and development, and design), brand names, and organizational fi rm-specifi c 
capital (Corrado, Haskel, Jona-Lasinio, and Iommi 2012). To the extent that 
the build-up of intangibles requires high-skilled labor, this will increase demand 
for the  latter. In an extended Heckscher–Ohlin framework, Haskel, Lawrence, 
Leamer, and Slaughter (2012) assume that skilled workers are more productive in 
tasks involving working with intangible capital and show how this might explain the 
evolution of relative wages in the United States. Moreover, intangibles like patents 
or trademarks are different from traditional capital assets as they typically have a 
large fi xed-cost component. This often gives rise to imperfect product markets and 
possibilities for mark-ups. When fi rms operating in such an environment enlarge 
cost shares cannot change over time. In the CES function, elasticities are also constant over time, but 
might vary from one. However, in cases of more than two factor inputs, they are diffi cult to defi ne.
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their scale of operations, capital is likely to gain more relative to labor. In a dynamic 
model of growth, increased openness and trade might reinforce higher levels of 
investment in intangibles as it expands the incentives for their creation: the larger 
the market in which the new invention will be used, the higher the potential for 
profi ts accruing to the investor.
Concluding Remarks
International production fragmentation is underway. The patterns of special-
ization found in case studies like the iPod have a macroeconomic equivalent. 
Our fi ndings fi t a broad story in which fi rms in mature economies relocate their 
unskilled-labor-intensive production activities to lower-wage countries, while 
keeping strategic and high-value-added functions concentrated at home where 
the skilled workers and intangible capital they need are available. But this shift of 
activities was decidedly non-neutral: capital shares in value added increased in both 
high-income and emerging economies. Further, we found declining value-added 
shares of low-skilled workers in emerging economies, contradicting traditional 
notions of comparative advantage. Squaring these facts will be an interesting chal-
lenge for further research. One possible explanation is a shift in manufacturing 
technologies that could have led to a worldwide decline in the demand for unskilled 
workers. This question can only be investigated from a global value chain perspec-
tive as analyses focusing on industries cannot distinguish between offshoring and 
technological change.
More generally, the impact of trade and cross-border investments on the distri-
bution of income across and within countries have been extensively debated (for 
an overview, see Harrison, McLaren, and McMillan 2011). In essence, international 
fragmentation expands the opportunities of countries to specialize according to 
comparative advantage and hence to gain from trade. As such, it is on average 
welfare improving, but not necessarily for all workers and owners of capital. We 
believe that the trade-offs involved can be better understood by  conceptualizing 
the production process as a set of tasks to be performed by combinations of factor 
inputs. For example, Costinot, Vogel, and Wang (2012) develop a model in which 
heterogeneous workers sort themselves into various stages of the production process. 
They fi nd that the consequences of opening up to trade on wage inequality may be 
very different from standard models, depending on the position of the workers in 
the chain. In particular, they fi nd that in the less-advanced country all workers move 
to upstream stages of production, decreasing wage inequality at the bottom of the 
skill distribution but at the same time increasing it at the top.
Many outcomes are theoretically possible, and it becomes ultimately an empir-
ical issue as to which patterns prevail. The development of world input-output tables 
is a fi rst step in this investigation. Future statistical frameworks, based on further 
integration of micro- and macro-statistics will allow for increasingly richer explana-
tions of the drivers and consequences of international production fragmentation.
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